Previous research has found evidence that in high-profile cases, political action committees (PACs) sometimes punish members of Congress for voting in opposition to the PACs' interests. This finding contradicts the conventional understanding of campaign contributions as an inducement or reward for voting record or access to a member of Congress. To understand better the dimensions of the punishment strategy, we test whether corporate PACs engage in punishment by examining the pattern of contributions of finance and insurance PACs in the wake of the House vote on granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China in May 2000. Using ordinary least squares regression models, we find support for a punishment strategy of finance and insurance PACs as a result of a no vote on PNTR. The magnitude of the punishment is highest for those members of the House who have the strongest relationship with the PAC.
tions. Support for this access strategy has been found among corporate PACs (Herndon, 1982; Gopoian, 1984 Gopoian, , 1985 Wright, 1985; Maitland, 1985; Denzau & Munger, 1986; Grier & Munger, 1986 , 1991 , 1993 Masters & Zardkoohi, 1986; Langbein, 1986 Langbein, , 1993 Saltzman, 1987; Langbein & Lotwis, 1990; Grier, Munger, & Torrent, 1990; Romer & Snyder, 1994) . Although access is certainly valued by business PACs, a second strategy is electoral/ideological. Using this strategy, PACs seek to reward members of Congress who have voted in support of their interests and whom they would consequently like to see reelected. Evidence for an electoral/ideological approach is seen by examining the relationship between factors such as the Chamber of Commerce rating of House members and the amount of contributions received from corporate PACs (Van Doren, Hoag, & Field, 1999; Eismer & Pollock, 1988; Grier & Munger, 1986 , 1993 .
We might wonder, however, whether business PACs shed these safe tactics for more risky approaches in certain high-profile cases. This article addresses this question by examining the campaign contributions of business PACs in response to the House vote on granting China permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR) on May 24, 2000. The risky strategy we investigate is whether businesses targeted certain incumbents for financial punishment based on their vote against PNTR. The particular business groups we study in this article are those from the finance and insurance industry.
Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the status of trade with China has been contentious. Each year, the decision of Congress to extend most favored nation status (MFN) to China has been fought over by business and labor groups as well as a variety of single-interest groups. These cleavages reappeared in the debate over PNTR as labor unions and bipartisan multifaith groups opposed PNTR (Rosin & Mufson, 2000) as well as some Chinese dissidents and human rights activists (McGregor, 2000) . MFN grants China the same rights, such as reduced tariffs and open markets, as all of the United States's trading partners in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Significantly, the Chinese do not extend the same benefits to the United States.
The House vote on PNTR was the most important step in the process of supporting China's entrance into the WTO. After that hurdle was cleared, the process moved relatively quickly as on September 19, 2000, the Senate authorized PNTR, and China joined the WTO on November 10, 2001. Without PNTR and Chinese membership in the WTO, the United States would have had to continue to deal with China in a bilateral fashion and address the trading relationship each year. Business groups, then, were particularly interested in the passage of PNTR. Business strategy requires not just open markets and free trade arrangements but some degree of stability. With the annual vote on MFN, many corporations were uncertain of future trade with China. More important, however, PNTR is the first step in the opening of what corporate America hopes will become a vast Chinese market for U.S. goods and services. In other words, PNTR is seen as taking what has been seen as predominantly a one-way street and opening it up to two-way traffic.
A key sector in which American businesses would benefit from PNTR is insurance and financial services. The Chinese market for insurance and financial services is gargantuan, growing, and largely untapped by U.S. companies. Total insurance premiums in China in 1998 were $14.3 billion (Mullins, 2000) . By 2000, premiums had risen to $19.27 billion (Allison, 2001) . Clearly, this market stands to grow as China's overall economic picture improves. U.S. finance and insurance companies also stand to benefit from stabilized trade with China because there are currently many restrictions on U.S. corporations' conducting insurance business in China. Once China is fully integrated into the WTO, it will become easier for U.S.-based insurance and financial service companies to conduct business in China (Treaster, 2000) . This benefit is compounded by the fact that the United States holds a comparative advantage in this sector over the nascent Chinese insurance and finance sector, as well as over its competitors in other industrialized countries.
Finance and insurance PACs not only had much to gain from PNTR with China, but they are also very important financial contributors to U.S. House members. Although overall, business PACs donated a total of $107,312,937 to the 403 incumbents who sought reelection in 2000, finance and insurance PACs donated a total of $25,872,714 to these same incumbents, or approximately 24% of the total. The changes in contribution patterns of such a significant financial player in U.S. congressional elections are certainly worthy of close investigation by political scientists.
We would expect, then, to find business groups-and especially finance and insurance groups-supportive of PNTR. What we are most interested in determining, though, is whether their support of PNTR would lead them to punish those members of Congress who voted in opposition to their wishes. This is an interesting test case for the theory of PAC punishment. To examine this case, we briefly present a theory of PAC punishment strategy. Second, we develop a model to explain the change in finance and insurance PAC contributions between the 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 election cycles. Finally, we present the results of regression analyses and discuss the light our findings shed on the risky PAC strategy of financial punishment.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Although much of the research on PACs has focused on their influence on legislative decision making, recent studies have found little consistent effect of contributions on roll call votes (Milyo, Primo, & Groseclose, 2000; Wawro, 2001) . In this article, our interest is not in how PACs influence legislators but in how the votes of legislators influence the contribution patterns of PACs. Although standard PAC strategies fall into access and electoral/ideological strategies in which PACs reward members who support their interests, these rewards develop an expectation on the part of the PAC that the member will continue to vote the way the PAC wants them to, especially in highprofile cases. What if a previously rewarded member "defects" on a key issue to the interest group? Would the interest group retaliate by punishing the defector? Axelrod (1984) argued that cooperation develops well when participants relate to one another through a "tit for tat" strategy. In his discussion of the decision-making process of members of Congress, Kingdon (1989) identifies the importance of interest group influence as well as a member's past voting pattern. This implies that previous commitments would lead to certain expectations on behalf of the PACs that fund candidates. Nevertheless, Kingdon (1989, p. 276) finds that voting history matters most in 64% of low-salience issues, whereas it matters most in only 34% of highsalience issues. Following Kingdon's findings, then, we would expect that legislators tend to feel less bound to their previous pattern of votes and to their commitments to interest groups on high-salience votes such as that over PNTR. From the point of view of an interest group, a usually reliable legislator can be expected to vote in a patterned manner on most votes. In the few high-salience cases, however, the relationship between legislator and interest group may become strained and lead the interest group to seek to punish the legislator. Previous research suggests that PACs may punish members of Congress in extreme cases of betrayal of the PACs'interests and also that generally the punishment will occur only in the election immediately following the defection (Engel & Jackson, 1998) .
Although the phenomenon of interest group punishment is not fully understood, related research by McCarty and Rothenberg (1996) finds no evidence of long-term commitments between legislators and PACs. In absence of these long-term "contracts," McCarty and Rothenberg argue that legislators do not punish PACs for their behavior. Our study is different in that we are studying whether PACs punish legislators and under what conditions punishment is likely to occur.
In the attempt to understand the context and reasons for PAC punishment, we rely on the rationales identified by philosophers and criminologists who have studied punishment in the criminal justice system (Baird & Rosenbaum, 1988; Bentham, 1995; Garland, 1990; Gorr & Harwood, 1995; Matravers, 1999; Walker, 1991) . Among the justifications for punishment identified by these scholars, two are especially relevant for our study of PAC punishment strategies: incapacitation and deterrence. Incapacitation is a strategy that seeks to disable the offender so that he or she can no longer harm others. This strategy supports punishment with an eye to future behavior. If a PAC incapacitates a legislator, the legislator can no longer serve the interests of the PAC. In other words, a PAC would seek to incapacitate only when it is ending an access relationship with a legislator.
Deterrence, as the name suggests, is punishment that is intended to deter someone from harming another. Deterrence, though, can function in two ways. First, one could punish someone to deter that person from committing the same wrong act. This is specific deterrence: Punishment deters the specific individual being punished. Second, one could punish an individual to send a message to others not to make the same mistakes. This is general deterrence. A PAC could follow either form of deterrence when punishing a legislator. The goal of the PAC is to exact financial punishment to prod the legislator into line to secure future votes (specific deterrence) or to signal others not to deviate (general deterrence). A specific deterrence strategy is followed when a PAC seeks to maintain access with a legislator. A legislator who is the subject of punishment as part of a general deterrence strategy may be rejected by the PAC or brought back in to the fold as a favored legislator.
Certainly, the effectiveness of these strategies for punishment in the criminal justice system is up for debate. One might also wonder whether these justifications have an effect on legislator behavior. That, however, is not the subject of this article. Rather, we are concerned with determining whether business PACs punish in high-profile cases such as the vote over PNTR. This is a study of the dimensions and patterns of PAC contribution behavior, not whether they achieve their goals.
Of the several rationales for punishment, then, incapacitation and specific deterrence are most relevant to test PAC punishment strategies. If an incapacitation strategy is followed, a PAC is signaling that it no longer seeks access from that legislator and it is either ending its interest in electoral politics or moving on to support other legislators. Evidence for this would include such dramatic action as eliminating funding for an incumbent altogether. In general, we would not expect business PACs to follow such strategies because of their continuing interest in politics and due to the wide range of legislative issues that affect them. Corporate PACs would not be likely to sever their access to a legislator over one "wrong" vote. They might, however, seek to punish legislators in such a way that they send them a message about future behavior. It seems likely, then, that if business PACs punish at all it will be as a form of specific deterrence. This allows the PAC to send a message regarding electoral/ideological factors while maintaining access.
Despite the tendency of corporations to shy away from punishment, the rhetoric of business PACs over PNTR suggested they planned a punishment strategy for the 2000 elections. Thomas Donohue, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, bluntly stated that House members who vote against PNTR "may find the 2000 elections more cumbersome than they thought," and he added, "you make this vote at your own peril" (Lochhead, 1999, p. A3) . According to USA Today, "Business groups . . . threatened to use campaign donations to defeat anti-PNTR House members" (Cox, 2000, p. 5A) .
Because finance and insurance was one of the sectors set to benefit most from passage of PNTR, we should not be surprised to discover threatening rhetoric from their ranks. During the debate over PNTR, the vice president of the American Council of Life Insurers, Phil Anderson, pointed out that financial services firms "will be scoring how members of Congress vote" (Brostoff, 2000) . After the vote, business groups were under attack for what unions believed to be their heavy-handed tactics. Gary Benanav, CEO of New York Life International, an insurance company, said, "I'm not apologizing. Yes, we rolled out every resource because we believe it was critical for all of us" (Cox, 2000, p. 5A) . This rhetoric makes it very clear that business groups did not plan to reward members of Congress who voted in favor of granting China PNTR but intended instead to punish those who voted against it.
Previous research has shown evidence of labor PAC punishment over trade issues such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (Engel & Jackson, 1998) . It may be the case that business PACs have learned from this practice. This possibility is suggested by Robert N. Burt, head of the Business Roundtable, who asserted that "unions have been superbly successful on trade issues and we have really learned from them" (Kahn, 2000, p. A1) . How businesses came to the decision to punish is not the topic of this article. We are concerned with the question of whether punishment actually occurred.
Thus, the vote on PNTR is an especially helpful case for examining PAC contribution strategy. Although congressional Republicans generally favored the bill, the tension between right-wing Christian groups' opposition to the bill and big-business support for it put some Republicans in a bind. In the end, 57 of the 221 House Republicans opposed the bill. Many Democrats were in a similarly tight spot. Although the Clinton administration heartily endorsed the bill, labor PACs opposed it and threatened to punish Democratic lawmakers for supporting it. In the end, 73 Democrats supported the bill. Legislation that so strongly breaks out of the partisan mold and shows in stark con-trast the interest group and ideological cleavages within the parties is inherently interesting and especially enlightening of PAC behavior.
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
We developed a model to test whether finance and insurance PACs punished opponents of PNTR by examining the pattern of reported campaign contributions in the 1999-2000 election cycle to House incumbents who voted on PNTR. We examined change in direct contributions from finance and insurance PACs between the 1998 election cycle and the 2000 cycle as the dependent variable. This model shows that a negative coefficient for a nay vote on PNTR means that controlling for other effects, a member received a cut in funding for having defied the interest groups' preferences and did not merely receive less money than yes voters did. After all, because interest groups have limited financial resources, a reward for some members cannot exist without a punishment of some others in terms of the allocation of one funding cycle's direct contributions. On the other hand, if a nay vote on PNTR, ceteris paribus, results in a reduction in funding for an incumbent between 1998 and 2000, then certainly the interest group may safely be said to have acted in a punishing manner. Our key independent variable, then, is a nay vote on PNTR. Control variables include the adjusted difference in overall business contributions between 1998 and 2000, the number of full terms served in Congress, electoral security measured in terms of points over 50 in the 1998 election, 1999 Chamber of Commerce rating, whether a member was on the Financial Services or Ways and Means Committees, and whether finance and insurance PACs were the largest PAC contributors in 1998. We also include an interaction term for a nay vote on PNTR and having received more money from finance and insurance PACs in the 1998 election cycle than from any other kind of PAC (for details on these variables, please see the appendix).
Based on the rhetoric and the clear positions of the organizations, we would expect finance and insurance PACs to punish those House incumbents who voted against granting PNTR with China by contributing less to their reelection campaigns in 2000 than they contributed in 1998. However, as our theory and trends in the data suggest, finance and insurance PACs might not treat all incumbents the same. Specifically, we hypothesize that the difference in finance and insurance PAC contributions between 1998 and 2000 for Republicans will decrease if they voted against PNTR. Among Democrats, we do not expect the vote on PNTR to have any impact on the difference in finance and insurance contributions between 1998 and 2000. There are some Democrats, however, who are closer to finance and insurance PACs and for whom punishment may have been an option in the wake of the PNTR vote. For this reason, we examine whether those Democrats who received more money from finance and insurance PACs in 1998 than from any other kind of PAC were punished.
RESULTS
To test these hypotheses, we ran two ordinary least squares regression models. The first model explains the change in finance and insurance PACs' contributions between 1998 and 2000 for all House Republican incumbents who ran for reelection in 2000. The second model explains the change for only Democratic incumbents who sought reelection in 2000.
There are a number of good reasons to analyze the parties separately. First, Republicans get much more money from finance and insurance PACs than Democrats do. During the 2000 election cycle, finance and insurance PACs donated an average of $77,106 to each Republican incumbent who sought reelection (n = 196), whereas each Democrat (n = 202) received an average of only $52,645 (t = 3.944, p = .000). If finance and insurance PACs punish those who most rely on their funds for voting against PNTR, we would expect them to hit Republicans the hardest.
Second, Democrats were in the minority in the House during the 1999-2000 election cycle. It is reasonable to suspect that interest groups will follow a different contribution strategy with members of the minority party than with members of the majority party (Rudolph, 1999) . For example, because access to powerful members on key committees is important, finance and insurance PACs may contribute more to majority-party members of key committees than other major-ity party members, but they may not follow a similar pattern with members of the minority party.
A final condition involves other sources of money available for incumbents. The business community was nearly united in its support for PNTR, and Republicans rely most heavily on business contributions. 1 This makes it more difficult for a Republican to vote against PNTR and substitute money from other PACs for any money lost from business groups. Democrats could at least turn, potentially, to organized labor to compensate them for contributions lost from business due to a nay vote on PNTR.
The results of the first regression (Republicans only) are presented in Table 1. 2 As expected, the model indicates that Republicans experienced substantial financial punishment from finance and insurance PACs for voting against PNTR. A nay vote alone cost a Republican $8,656.50, holding all else constant.
3 If a Republican received more money from finance and insurance PACs in 1998 than from any other kind of PAC yet still voted against PNTR, the PACs cut funding in 2000 by $17,376.59, holding all else constant. Although the size of this cut appears gaudy, we must keep in mind that these Republicans received much more from finance and insurance PACs in 1998 than others did. 4 Finance and insurance PACs punished Republicans hard for a nay vote on PNTR.
Other variables that influence the difference in finance and insurance PAC contributions to Republicans between 1998 and 2000 include the overall change in business contributions to Republicans, which is positively related and membership on either the Ways and Means or Financial Services Committees, each of which leads to large increases in contributions. Each of these relationships is as expected.
In Table 2 , the results for the model involving Democrats are presented. As expected, finance and insurance PACs did not punish Democrats for their opposition to PNTR alone. However, if finance and insurance PACs were the number one PAC contributor in 1998 and a Democrat voted no, then he or she received a $33,003.97 cut, holding all else constant. Finance and insurance PACs punished hard the Democrats who relied most heavily on their contributions yet still rejected the PACs' preferences on PNTR. This larger punishment of Demo- crats than Republicans may indicate that the closeness of the previous relationship between PAC and legislator means more to finance and insurance PACs than does party identification. The other variables that influence a change in finance and insurance PACs' contributions are overall change in business contributions, which is positively related; Chamber of Commerce rating, which predicts an increase; membership on the financial services committee, which also predicts an increase; and, tellingly, finance and insurance PACs' having been the largest PAC contributors in 1998, which alone leads to an increase of $35,462.00.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Previous research has indicated that labor PACs financially punish their allies in the U.S. House for deviation on a key vote. It has remained uncertain if corporate PACs follow the same strategy and if so, under what conditions. It turns out that business PACs are not so different from labor PACs, and they may in fact learn from them. Clearly, finance and insurance PACs punished some House members for voting no on the granting of permanent normal trading relations with China. It is also clear that finance and insurance PACs punished especially hard the members with whom they have the closest relationships. This indicates that business PAC punishment over PNTR is part of a specific deterrence strategy. These PACs indicated their interest in maintaining an access relationship while sending a message about voting against their interests. If these PACs had punished candidates who were not closely allied with them, it could possibly be understood as a form of incapacitation. Because they attacked their allies, it should be understood as a specific deterrent form of punishment.
Finance and insurance PAC punishment of Democrats tells us a number of important things about punishment strategy as well. First, business PACs do not punish those over whom they expect to have little influence, which likely includes the bulk of Democrats. Why would business PACs punish the majority of Democrats when they give them less money and Democrats have a ready source of funds to substitute for any cut from business, namely, organized labor? For those Democrats who tend to rely on their support, however, a punishment strategy may make sense.
Moreover, finance and insurance PACs' refusal to punish Democrats overall, while strongly punishing Democrats who previously most relied on finance and insurance funding, offers additional evidence that business PACs followed a pattern of specific deterrence and not general deterrence. By punishing most heavily only those over whom they ought to have the most influence, finance and insurance PACs clearly demonstrated that they were interested in preventing future digression by these members and correcting the wayward behavior of deviant friends. If they had elected to punish all Democrats, who could more easily make up the lost revenue from other sources, the effect would have been more symbolic in nature and indicative of a strategy of general deterrence instead of specific.
The fact that business PACs would engage in a punishment strategy at all is particularly striking given their broad-based approach to political activity. Typically, we would expect single-interest groups to be most likely to engage in punishment. The behavior of finance and insurance PACs in this case demonstrates that in certain high-profile cases, business PACs act in ways similar to single-interest groups. The publicity and importance of this vote made punishment an option where it might not have been in a less visible case. The salience of an issue may make punishment a necessity in terms of maintaining an interest group's credibility, especially if they threaten to punish as business groups did over the PNTR vote. PAC punishment over PNTR can be seen as a message to legislators: Business PACs mean business.
APPENDIX Variable Summary
Change in finance/insurance PAC contributions 1998-2000. The difference in how much finance and insurance political action committees (PACs) contributed to House incumbents between 1998 and 2000. Calculated by subtracting 1998 contributions from 2000 contributions. Source: The Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org). This is a reputable organization when it comes to campaign finance information. They are nonpartisan, and their funding derives from sources such as The Pew Charitable Foundation and the Ford Foundation. As their own Web site states their mission, "The Center conducts computer-based research on campaign finance issues for the news media, academics, activists, and the public at large" (http:// www.opensecrets.org/about/index.asp). 
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gov).
Points above 50% in 1998 election. This is a measure of electoral security based on percentage of the two-party vote. It is coded 0 to 50 for percentage points over half of the two-party vote that the incumbent received in the 1998 general election. Source: New York Times and Almanac of American Politics.
1999 Chamber of Commerce rating. This is the percentage of votes during the first session of the 106th Congress rated as "correct" by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. We use the 1999 Chamber of Commerce rating as a measure of finance and insurance PACs' perception of the overall friendliness to business interests of a member of Congress. It does not measure these PACs' perception of support for only their sector of the economy. We expect finance and insurance PACs to behave similarly to the rest of the business community and punish enemies and reward friends of business in general. Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce (www.uschamber.org).
Member of Financial Services
Committee. This is a dummy variable coded 1 for members of the House Financial Services Committee and 0 for nonmembers in the 106th Congress. We expect finance and insurance PACs to donate more to members of this committee. Source: U.S. House of Representatives (www.house.gov).
Member of Ways and Means
Committee. This is a dummy variable coded 1 for members of the House Ways and Means Committee and 0 for nonmembers in the 106th Congress. We expect finance and insurance PACs to donate more to members of this committee. Source: U.S. House of Representatives (www.house.gov).
Member of party leadership. A dummy variable coded 1 for members of the House leadership and 0 for all others. Among Republicans, coded 1 for speaker, majority leader, majority whip, chairman of the House Republican Conference, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, vice chairman of the House Republican Conference, and secretary of the House Republican Conference. Democrats were coded 1 for Democratic leader, Democratic whip, caucus chair and vice chair, assistant to the Democratic leader, congressional campaign committee chairwoman, steering committee co-chair, chief deputy whips, chair of the congressional Hispanic caucus, chair of the New Democrat coalition, chair of the congressional Black caucus, chair of the Blue Dog Coalition, chair of the women's caucus, and chair of the progressive caucus. Source: U.S. House of Representatives, (www.house.gov).
Voted against PNTR-Finance/Insurance PACs were top 1998 contributor. A dummy variable coded 1 for incumbents who voted against PNTR and received more money from finance and insurance groups than any other PAC.
Finance/insurance PACs were top 1998 contributor. A dummy variable coded 1 for incumbents who received more money from finance and insurance groups than any other PAC.
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